Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. II: \(2 \times 2\) games

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.004zbMath1308.91036OpenAlexW1984194838MaRDI QIDQ462864

Roberto Serrano, Rene Saran

Publication date: 22 October 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationBayesian equilibrium\(2\times 2\) gamesex-post regret heuristicsminimax regret equilibriumquasi-supermodular games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching

Cites Work

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• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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