Backward induction and unacceptable offers

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.01.013zbMath1308.91066OpenAlexW2072435518MaRDI QIDQ462872

Quan Wen, Harold Houba

Publication date: 22 October 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.013

zbMATH Keywords

delaybargainingnegotiationirrevocable breakdown

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
• A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
• On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
• Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining
• Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs
• The Condorcet paradox revisited
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
• Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions

This page was built for publication: Backward induction and unacceptable offers