On essential, (strictly) perfect equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.010zbMath1308.91009OpenAlexW2023253485MaRDI QIDQ462873

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Publication date: 22 October 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium existenceperfect equilibriumstrictly perfect equilibriumessential equilibriuminfinite normal-form gamepayoff security

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (2)

Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information ⋮ On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games

Cites Work

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• Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games

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