GOVERNMENT DEBT AND BANKING FRAGILITY: THE SPREADING OF STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY

DOI10.1111/IERE.12323zbMATH Open1419.91503OpenAlexW2170294809MaRDI QIDQ4629223

Author name not available (Why is that?)

Publication date: 21 March 2019

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19278.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

financial marketsgovernment debtNash equilibrium banking fragility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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