Reflective Evolution Under Strategic Uncertainty

DOI10.1142/S0218127419500184zbMath1411.91085OpenAlexW2922337407WikidataQ128273548 ScholiaQ128273548MaRDI QIDQ4630077

Arnaud Z. Dragicevic

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0218127419500184

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorystructured populationbioeconomicsstrategic uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

Conditional rehabilitation of cooperation under strategic uncertainty

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Option fund market dynamics for threshold public goods
• Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory
• Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment
• Evolutionary game dynamics in populations with different learners
• Mutation rate evolution in replicator dynamics
• The evolution of \(n\)-player cooperation -- threshold games and ESS bifurcations
• Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• Cores of convex games
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• The replicator equation and other game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Complex adaptive systems: Exploring the known, the unknown and the unknowable
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

This page was built for publication: Reflective Evolution Under Strategic Uncertainty