Stability of fixed points of set-valued mappings and strategic stability of Nash equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4631314
DOI10.22436/jnsa.010.07.20zbMath1412.90137OpenAlexW2735197462MaRDI QIDQ4631314
Shunyou Xia, Chenwei Liu, Yanlong Yang, Jihao He, Shu-wen Xiang
Publication date: 24 April 2019
Published in: The Journal of Nonlinear Sciences and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.22436/jnsa.010.07.20
Noncooperative games (91A10) Multi-objective and goal programming (90C29) Sensitivity, stability, parametric optimization (90C31)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Essential equilibria of discontinuous games
- On strategic stability in discontinuous games
- Persistent equilibria in strategic games
- Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies
- On the strongly essential components of Nash equilibria of infinite \(n\)-person games with quasiconcave payoffs
- Fixed points of contractible valued correspondences
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- On essential components of the solution set of generalized games
- On quasi-stable sets
- Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof
- Existence and stability of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium for generalized multiobjective multi-leader-follower games
- Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games
- On the Relation Among Some Definitions of Strategic Stability
- On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Sequential Equilibria
- Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
- On essential components of the set of Nash equilibrium points
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Essential equilibria
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
This page was built for publication: Stability of fixed points of set-valued mappings and strategic stability of Nash equilibria