The impact of operational decisions on the design of salesforce incentives

DOI10.1002/nav.21585zbMath1411.90192OpenAlexW3122397229MaRDI QIDQ4632840

Soroush Saghafian, Xiuli Chao

Publication date: 2 May 2019

Published in: Naval Research Logistics (NRL) (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/107557

zbMATH Keywords

inventory controlmoral hazardadverse selectionprincipal agentdynamic incentive design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

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Ambiguous partially observable Markov decision processes: structural results and applications ⋮ Salesforce contract design, joint pricing and production planning with asymmetric overconfidence sales agent

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