Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise
From MaRDI portal
Publication:463398
DOI10.1134/S0005117914050178zbMath1307.91071MaRDI QIDQ463398
Publication date: 16 October 2014
Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
An efficient solution of the resource allotment problem with the Groves-Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility, Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Use of intersection property for analysis of feasibility of multicriteria expertise results
- Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
