ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS
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Publication:4634427
DOI10.1111/iere.12266zbMath1403.91134OpenAlexW2906315758MaRDI QIDQ4634427
Jordi Massó, Shurojit Chatterji
Publication date: 10 April 2018
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1720
Related Items (9)
Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains ⋮ Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains ⋮ A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains ⋮ On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization ⋮ Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs
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