BELIEVING EPISTEMIC CONTRADICTIONS

DOI10.1017/S1755020316000514OpenAlexW2745011426MaRDI QIDQ4637950

Simon Goldstein, Bob Beddor

Publication date: 3 May 2018

Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020316000514

zbMATH Keywords

probabilitydynamic semanticsepistemic modalsbelief reports

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic of natural languages (03B65)

Related Items (2)

Logics for belief as maximally plausible possibility ⋮ MODALITY AND EXPRESSIBILITY

Cites Work

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• Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief
• Epistemic modals and informational consequence
• Defaults in update semantics
• A counterexample to modus tollens
• Believing Things Unknown
• Elusive Knowledge
• Modals and ConditionalsNew and Revised Perspectives
• Context Probabilism
• Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis
• Dynamic predicate logic
• Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics

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