Nash equilibria for voter models with randomly perceived positions

DOI10.1080/15326349.2017.1389285zbMath1386.91062OpenAlexW2772673841MaRDI QIDQ4639230

Jeffrey S. Rosenthal

Publication date: 3 May 2018

Published in: Stochastic Models (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/15326349.2017.1389285

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryNash equilibriumvoter modelmultiple partiesuncertain position

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (1)

Many-candidate Nash equilibria for elections involving random selection

Cites Work

• Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
• Non-cooperative games
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Nash equilibria for voter models with randomly perceived positions