Verifiable Side-Channel Security of Cryptographic Implementations: Constant-Time MEE-CBC

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-52993-5_9zbMath1387.94064OpenAlexW2402906095MaRDI QIDQ4639476

Gilles Barthe, François Dupressoir, Manuel Barbosa, José Bacelar Almeida

Publication date: 9 May 2018

Published in: Fast Software Encryption (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/51554

zbMATH Keywords

block cipherprovable securityleakage modelrandom coinsecurity notion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (2)

Certified compilation for cryptography: extended x86 instructions and constant-time verification ⋮ Unnamed Item

Uses Software

• OpenSSL
• s2n

Cites Work

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• System-level non-interference of constant-time cryptography. II: Verified static analysis and stealth memory
• Lucky Microseconds: A Timing Attack on Amazon’s s2n Implementation of TLS
• Security of Symmetric Encryption against Mass Surveillance
• The Security Impact of a New Cryptographic Library
• On Symmetric Encryption with Distinguishable Decryption Failures
• Tag Size Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the TLS Record Protocol
• Rogue Decryption Failures: Reconciling AE Robustness Notions
• Faster and Timing-Attack Resistant AES-GCM
• Computer-Aided Security Proofs for the Working Cryptographer
• EasyCrypt: A Tutorial
• Formal certification of a compiler back-end or
• Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003

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