Key Recovery Attack Against 2.5-Round $$\pi $$ -Cipher

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-52993-5_27zbMath1385.94017OpenAlexW2505690073MaRDI QIDQ4639497

Hadi Soleimany, Goutam Paul, Dhiman Saha, Valentin Suder, Christina Boura, Avik Chakraborti, Gaëtan Leurent

Publication date: 9 May 2018

Published in: Fast Software Encryption (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52993-5_27

zbMATH Keywords

cryptanalysisauthenticated encryptionCAESAR competitionguess and determine\(\pi \)-Cipher

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Differential Forgery Attack Against LAC
• On the Indifferentiability of the Sponge Construction

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