Making the Most of Your Samples
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Publication:4641589
DOI10.1137/16M1065719zbMath1390.91146arXiv1407.2479OpenAlexW2799687852WikidataQ129870200 ScholiaQ129870200MaRDI QIDQ4641589
Tim Roughgarden, Yishay Mansour, Zhi-Yi Huang
Publication date: 18 May 2018
Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.2479
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (8)
Revenue-Maximizing Auctions: A Bidder’s Standpoint ⋮ Pricing with Samples ⋮ Improved two sample revenue guarantees via mixed-integer linear programming ⋮ A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders ⋮ Making the Most of Your Samples ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions ⋮ Learning in Repeated Auctions
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- Making the Most of Your Samples
- Neural Network Learning
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- Bayesian Mechanism Design
- How Far Can We Go Beyond Linear Cryptanalysis?
- Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
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