Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power
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Publication:4644753
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_1zbMath1427.91120OpenAlexW137030691MaRDI QIDQ4644753
Manfred J. Holler, Hannu Nurmi
Publication date: 8 January 2019
Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_1
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