Voting and Power

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_8zbMath1419.91252OpenAlexW2239409213MaRDI QIDQ4644756

Federico Valenciano, Annick Laruelle

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_8

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powerpower indexwinning coalitionvote powervote rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
• Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
• Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule
• Power indices and the veil of ignorance
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf Indices Revisited
• The Bargaining Problem
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER

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