Minimax Multi-District Apportionments

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_10zbMath1419.91250OpenAlexW44294875WikidataQ63379529 ScholiaQ63379529MaRDI QIDQ4644757

Gianfranco Gambarelli, Arsen Palestini

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_10

zbMATH Keywords

minimax methodpower indexfairness criterionelectoral systemsimple majority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission's recommendation

Cites Work

• Common behaviour of power indices
• The coming of game theory
• Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
• An Axiomatic Approach to Proportionality Between Matrices
• The Mathematics of Voting and Elections: A Hands-On Approach
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Generating functions for computing power indices efficiently

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