Gridlock or Leadership in U.S. Electoral Politics

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_11zbMath1419.91262OpenAlexW15611142MaRDI QIDQ4644759

Norman Schofield, Evan Schnidman

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_11

zbMATH Keywords

local Nash equilibriumvalencestochastic electoral modelelectoral perceptions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

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