On the Nucleolus as a Power Index

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_15zbMath1419.91048OpenAlexW2261574202MaRDI QIDQ4644763

Maria Montero

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_15

zbMATH Keywords

power indexsimple gamewinning coalitiongrand coalitionpayoff vector

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value ⋮ Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory ⋮ The nucleolus of large majority games ⋮ Brexit and power in the Council of the European Union

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