Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_17zbMath1419.91249OpenAlexW42810619MaRDI QIDQ4644765

Montserrat Pons, Josep Freixas

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_17

zbMATH Keywords

local poweroptimal bribable votersoptimal persuadable voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Inferior players in simple games
• Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
• A CLASS OF MAJORITY GAMES
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• Multilinear Extensions of Games

This page was built for publication: Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters