Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and $$ \uppi $$ π

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_30zbMath1419.91266arXiv1104.5213OpenAlexW1958819135MaRDI QIDQ4644768

Karol Życzkowski, Wojciech Słomczyński

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1104.5213

zbMATH Keywords

European unionlarge statemember statesmall statevote system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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