A Geometric Approach to Paradoxes of Majority Voting: From Anscombe’s Paradox to the Discursive Dilemma with Saari and Nurmi

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_33zbMath1419.91247OpenAlexW160341628MaRDI QIDQ4644770

Christian Klamler, Daniel Eckert

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_33

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theoryaggregation rulejudgment aggregationmajority voteindividual valuation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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