Pure Bargaining Problems and the Shapley Rule

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_36zbMath1419.91315OpenAlexW2182659324MaRDI QIDQ4644774

Francesc Carreras, Guillermo Owen

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_36

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuebargaining problems with transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Sharing the surplus and proportional values ⋮ Axiomatizations of the proportional division value

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