Veto Players and Non-Cooperative Foundations of Power in Legislative Bargaining
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Publication:4644775
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_37zbMath1419.91023OpenAlexW16964884MaRDI QIDQ4644775
Publication date: 8 January 2019
Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_37
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- A new index of power for simple n-person games
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Bargaining and Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
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