Veto Players and Non-Cooperative Foundations of Power in Legislative Bargaining

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_37zbMath1419.91023OpenAlexW16964884MaRDI QIDQ4644775

Andreas Nohn

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_37

zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingShapley-Shubik indexveto playersnoncooperative support for power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power

Cites Work

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• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Bargaining and Value
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

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