Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4645408
DOI10.3982/QE135zbMath1419.91192MaRDI QIDQ4645408
Pedro Rey-Biel, Nagore Iriberri
Publication date: 10 January 2019
Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
experimentsinterdependent preferencesbelief elicitationinequity aversionsocial informationmixture of-types modelssocial welfare maximizing
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