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Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies - MaRDI portal

Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies

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Publication:4651467

DOI10.1137/S0097539701397059zbMath1080.90046MaRDI QIDQ4651467

Tim Roughgarden

Publication date: 21 February 2005

Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)




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