The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
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Publication:4652256
DOI10.1137/S0036144503435945zbMath1104.91020OpenAlexW3121899235MaRDI QIDQ4652256
Publication date: 25 February 2005
Published in: SIAM Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/s0036144503435945
monotonicitygame theoryNash equilibriumdominancedecentralizationmechanism designcomplete and incomplete informationimplementation theory
Applications of game theory (91A80) Fundamental topics (basic mathematics, methodology; applicable to economics in general) (91B02) Mathematics for nonmathematicians (engineering, social sciences, etc.) (00A06) Social choice (91B14)
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