LEARNING TO PLAY BEST RESPONSE IN DUOPOLY GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198904000290zbMath1102.91311OpenAlexW2072275855MaRDI QIDQ4655036

Jan Wenzelburger

Publication date: 10 March 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198904000290

zbMATH Keywords

learningheterogeneitybounded rationalityduopoly games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

SOPHISTICATED ENFORCEMENT AND ADAPTIVE OFFENDERS ⋮ Heterogeneous expectations and equilibria selection in an evolutionary overlapping generations model

Cites Work

• Simple and complex adjustment dynamics in Cournot duopoly models.
• Dynamic complexity in duopoly games
• Exotic phenomena in games and duopoly models
• Multistability and cyclic attractors in duopoly games
• Global convergence of adaptive learning in models of pure exchange
• Nonlinear dynamics in the Cournot model without full information
• Subjective games and equilibria
• Learning in economic systems with expectations feedback
• Error bounds for bicubic spline interpolation
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Minimization by Successive Approximation
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