Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions

DOI10.1016/j.cosrev.2012.03.001zbMath1298.68101arXiv1108.4439OpenAlexW2032316105MaRDI QIDQ465694

Curtis Menton, Preetjot Singh

Publication date: 24 October 2014

Published in: Computer Science Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4439

zbMATH Keywords

complexityvoting theorycomputational social choicemanipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to computer science (68-02) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control ⋮ The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules

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