FORMALIZATION OF MULTI-LEVEL GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198904000150zbMath1087.91002OpenAlexW1977645093MaRDI QIDQ4661976

Kjell Hausken, Ross Cressman

Publication date: 30 March 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198904000150

zbMATH Keywords

methodological individualismempowerment from belowMultilevel game theorymultilevel Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (1)

Optimal hierarchy structures for multi-attribute-criteria decisions

Cites Work

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• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• Dynamic rent-seeking games
• Migration and intergroup conflict
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• Non-cooperative games
• FORMULATION AND APPLICATIONS OF HIERARCHY GAMES
• The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Multistage Situations
• Learning game theory from John Harsanyi

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