Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
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Publication:4662755
DOI10.1162/0033553041502207zbMath1074.91515OpenAlexW2211624284WikidataQ56385456 ScholiaQ56385456MaRDI QIDQ4662755
Matthew O. Jackson, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 30 March 2005
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041502207
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