Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00311zbMath1103.91009OpenAlexW2118393728MaRDI QIDQ4663335

Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel

Publication date: 30 March 2005

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00311

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (35)

Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ Dynamic contributions to a public project: the impact of rising marginal benefit and completion benefits ⋮ Arbitration systems and negotiations ⋮ Sequential bargaining with common values ⋮ Duplicative search ⋮ Search without looking ⋮ Shipwrecks and treasure hunters ⋮ Multilateral bargaining with concession costs ⋮ KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION ⋮ The gambling effect of final-offer arbitration in bargaining ⋮ Holdup, search, and inefficiency ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda ⋮ Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining ⋮ Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents. ⋮ Strategic information exchange ⋮ Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river ⋮ A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment. ⋮ Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Bargaining with history-dependent preferences ⋮ Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments ⋮ Teamwise mean field competitions ⋮ Strategic divide and choose ⋮ A theory of bargaining deadlock ⋮ Emergence and nonemergence of alternating offers in bilateral bargaining ⋮ On dynamic compromise ⋮ Coordination need not be a problem ⋮ Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent ⋮ Credit attribution and collaborative work ⋮ A model of gradual information disclosure ⋮ Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games ⋮ Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players ⋮ Strategic disclosure of feasible options

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