Optimal Taxation with Private Government Information

DOI10.1111/0034-6527.00320zbMath1103.91397OpenAlexW2126551210MaRDI QIDQ4663345

Christopher Sleet

Publication date: 30 March 2005

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00320

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete insurancemaximally indebtedoptimal incentive compatible allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (3)

The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a new Keynesian model with private information ⋮ Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets ⋮ Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets

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