An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents

DOI10.1080/15427951.2004.10129086zbMath1181.91077OpenAlexW2007201570WikidataQ106376689 ScholiaQ106376689MaRDI QIDQ4665444

Éva Tardos, Aaron Archer, Kunal Talwar, Christos H. Papadimitriou

Publication date: 11 April 2005

Published in: Internet Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/15427951.2004.10129086

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcombinatorial auctiontruthfulnessselfish agentset-packing problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (7)

Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms ⋮ Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation ⋮ Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions ⋮ On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets ⋮ Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents ⋮ Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach

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