STRATEGIC CORES IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY

DOI10.1142/S0219198904000332zbMath1108.91334OpenAlexW2001624493MaRDI QIDQ4675820

Yukihisa Utsumi, Mikio Nakayama

Publication date: 6 May 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198904000332

zbMATH Keywords

strong equilibriumself-supporting coalitional equilibriumthe alpha-core, the beta-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
• Nash Equilibria and Pareto Optimal Income Redistribution
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods

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