High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring

DOI10.3982/TE2627zbMath1396.91026OpenAlexW2789794660MaRDI QIDQ4682723

Eilon Solan, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2627

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcharacterizationcostly monitoringhigh frequency repeated gamesno folk theorempublic perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization

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