Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets

DOI10.3982/TE2793zbMath1396.91563OpenAlexW2793315095MaRDI QIDQ4682728

Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2793

zbMATH Keywords

payoff equivalencePareto efficiencylarge matching markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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