Inefficient rushes in auctions

DOI10.3982/TE2513zbMath1396.91253MaRDI QIDQ4682729

Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Fabio Michelucci

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionsmechanism designprivatizationmulti-round mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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