Career concerns with exponential learning

DOI10.3982/TE2115zbMath1396.91356OpenAlexW2183748348WikidataQ115482642 ScholiaQ115482642MaRDI QIDQ4682763

Johannes Hörner, Alessandro Bonatti

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2115

zbMATH Keywords

experimentationreputationcareer concernscareer pathsup-or-out

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent ⋮ Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination ⋮ Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels ⋮ Strategic investment evaluation ⋮ When to Release Feedback in a Dynamic Tournament ⋮ Working to learn ⋮ Dynamic expert incentives in teams ⋮ Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types ⋮ A note on optimal experimentation under risk aversion

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