One-dimensional mechanism design

DOI10.3982/TE2307zbMath1396.91115OpenAlexW2473009181MaRDI QIDQ4682769

Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2307

zbMATH Keywords

votingrationingsingle-peaked preferencesleximin orderingstrategyproof mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (7)

Groupstrategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism for constrained rationing problems ⋮ All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof ⋮ Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research ⋮ Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets ⋮ A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem

This page was built for publication: One-dimensional mechanism design