Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring

DOI10.3982/TE2270zbMath1396.91027OpenAlexW2413287061MaRDI QIDQ4682772

Alexander Wolitzky, Takuo Sugaya

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2270

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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