Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games*

DOI10.1111/sjoe.12003zbMath1397.91118OpenAlexW2108027622MaRDI QIDQ4683652

Marc Vorsatz, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters, Markus Walzl

Publication date: 21 September 2018

Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/f68df75b-2b83-4197-a1e6-adcd6d3378b3

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsender-receiver gamesstrategic information transmissioninstitutional selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Delegation based on cheap talk ⋮ Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication ⋮ Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study ⋮ Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling

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