Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance

DOI10.3982/TE737zbMath1397.91463MaRDI QIDQ4683686

Yuzhe Zhang, Bala Ravikumar

Publication date: 21 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

optimal taxationtax auditingstochastic costly state verificationtax compliance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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