Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: Results on the technology of trade and investment

DOI10.3982/TE818zbMath1397.91245MaRDI QIDQ4683688

Joel Watson, Kristy Buzard

Publication date: 21 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcontractrenegotiationspecific investmentholdupforcing contractsnonforcing contractstechnology of trade

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements ⋮ On the outside-option principle with one-sided options ⋮ The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation ⋮ Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons

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