An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem*
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Publication:4684813
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01734.xzbMath1397.91173OpenAlexW2131263029MaRDI QIDQ4684813
Jean-François Laslier, Joergen W. Weibull
Publication date: 25 September 2018
Published in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01734.x
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