The Shapley Value as a Sustainable Cooperative Solution in Differential Games of Three Players
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Publication:4687457
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_4zbMath1397.91087OpenAlexW2525373583MaRDI QIDQ4687457
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Publication date: 11 October 2018
Published in: Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_4
differential gameShapley valuecorecooperative gametime-consistencypollution controlstrong time-consistencyirrational behavior proofness
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Cites Work
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- FISH WARS WITH MANY PLAYERS
- TECHNICAL NOTE: "AN IRRATIONAL-BEHAVIOR-PROOF CONDITION IN COOPERATIVE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES"
- Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games
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