A Dynamic Model of a Decision Making Body Where the Power of Veto Can Be Invoked

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_7zbMath1397.91178OpenAlexW2525256087MaRDI QIDQ4687463

Jacek W. Mercik, David M. Ramsey

Publication date: 11 October 2018

Published in: Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_7

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumcoalition formationdynamic voting gamepower of veto

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data
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