Occurrence of Deception Under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Reputation Concerns
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Publication:4687466
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_10zbMath1397.91057OpenAlexW2524711559MaRDI QIDQ4687466
Publication date: 11 October 2018
Published in: Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_10
Cites Work
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
- Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
- Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Sequential Equilibria
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
- Bad Reputation
- Reputation in Long-Run Relationships
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Who Wants a Good Reputation?
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