A Model of Tacit Collusion: Nash-2 Equilibrium Concept

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-43838-2_13zbMath1397.91023OpenAlexW2282604764MaRDI QIDQ4687469

Marina S. Sandomirskaia

Publication date: 11 October 2018

Published in: Recent Advances in Game Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.hse.ru/org/hse/wp/prepfr_EC

zbMATH Keywords

Hotelling modeltacit collusionBertrand paradoxNash-2 equilibriumsecure deviation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Cites Work

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