scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1357433

Publication date: 4 November 1999

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

cooperative games simple games weighted games voting system voting games blocking coalitions winning coalitions Rudin-Keisler ordering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02)

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